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EXTRACTING OIL FROM TURMOIL:
THE IRAQI OIL INDUSTRY AND ITS ROLE AS A
PROMISING FUTURE PLAYER IN THE
GLOBAL ENERGY MARKET'
Ryan Frei
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, when assessing worldwide energy
sources, the international community's attention has been focused pri-
marily on new and promising zones of petroleum, such as Colombia,
Mexico, Canada, Eastern Europe, and parts of Africa.2 Prior to the
most recent armed conflict in Iraq, the constant turmoil in the Middle
East motivated governments and oil companies alike to "cut the umbil-
ical cord with the Persian Gulf" by diversifying oil supplies in an effort
to stabilize prices.3 Although Iraq was one of the five founding mem-
bers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC")
in 1960, three wars over the past two decades and twelve years of
United Nations sanctions have stymied its technological and economic
growth, essentially paralyzing Iraq's oil production capabilities.4
However, in the aftermath of the most recent war in Iraq, interested
parties all over the world are anxiously waiting for the enormous oil-
producing potential of dictator-free Iraq to be unlocked.3 Iraq has
emerged as "the most viable oil project in the world," having the sec-
ond-largest proven oil reserves out of all oil-exporting countries.6 A
significant concern for potential investors, however, is the political and
social instability plaguing Iraq.7 Iraq's oil infrastructure, having dete-
riorated over the past thirty-five years under governmental control,
1 The information and facts presented throughout this comment are current
through September 2003.
2 John Carey, Taming the Oil Beast: A Sensible, Step-by-Step Energy Policy is
Within Our Reach, Bus. WK., Feb. 24, 2003, at 96.
3 Id.
See, e.g., Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Iraq's Crude Awakening, TiE,
May 19, 2003, at 49 (discussing the current state of Iraqi oil production capabili-
ties); A. M. Samsam Bakhtiari, D'Arcy Concession Centennial and OPEC Today:
An Historical Perspective, Oa & GAS J., July 9, 2001, at 22 (describing Iraq as a
pioneer in OPEC and a promising source of oil).
' See Peter S. Goodman, Iraq is Ill-Equipped to Exploit Huge Oil Reserves, WASH.
PosT, June 4, 2003, at A01.
6 Id. at A16.
7 Id.
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can only be ameliorated concurrent with social, economic, and political
revival throughout the country.' While the war efforts of the United
States and Britain received scant support from the international com-
munity, rebuilding Iraq and revitalizing its oil infrastructure are two
tasks in which countless countries share a vested interest.
This comment discusses the social, economic, and political im-
plications of the Iraqi state-run oil industry, taking into account the
country's tumultuous history and the likely prospects for future indus-
try development. Part II discusses Iraq's history and the evolution of
its oil industry through the present day. Particular attention is paid to
Iraq's military conflicts under Saddam Hussein's regime, the interna-
tional community's response to Iraq's aggression, and the impact of
Iraq's United Nations violations on its oil industry. Part III analyzes
present-day Iraq as it recovers from its third war in two decades and
attempts to rebuild its economic, social, and political infrastructures.
Finally, Part IV forecasts likely scenarios and modes in which the
Iraqi oil industry will become a major participant in the global energy
market.
II. HISTORY OF IRAQ AND ITS TIES TO PETROLEUM
The discovery of oil in Kirkuk in 1927 introduced a factor that
would greatly influence Iraq's future development as a country and as
a player in the global economy.9 Oil production has been the dominant
force in the Iraqi economy since the 1950s, consistently accounting for
well over 90% of the country's exports and 98% of the Iraqi govern-
ment's revenues.'° Helping establish Iraq's role as a pioneer in the oil
industry, OPEC was founded in Baghdad in 1960." From its incep-
tion, OPEC's guiding principle was to "ensur[e] order and stability in
the international oil market at all times, with secure oil supplies at
reasonable prices that balance the needs of producers and consum-
ers."'12 Fulfilling that vision, between 1973 and 1982, Iraq and other
Middle Eastern oil-producing countries prospered while enhancing
supplies and exports of crude oil, natural gas, and refined products. 13
During this period, known as the "oil decade," Iraqi oil revenues
8 See Andrew C. Schneider, Business to Gain From a Reshaped Iraq, KIPLINGER
Bus. FORECASTS, Jan. 14, 2003.
9 Bakhtiari, supra note 4, at 23.
10 Rosemary E. Libera, Note, Divide, Conquer, and Pay: Civil Compensation for
Wartime Damages, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 291, 302-03 (2001).
'" The Future of Iraq's Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2003, at A24.
12 Press Release, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 124th Meeting
of the OPEC Conference (Mar. 11, 2003), available at http://www.opec.org/New-
sInfo/PressReleases/pr2003/PR3_2003.htm.13 Libera, supra note 10, at 302-03.
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ranged from a low of $1.8 billion in 1973 to a high of $26 billion in
1980.14 Persian Gulf petroleum exports reached their peak in 1974,
when the region supplied more than two-thirds of all oil traded in in-
ternational markets.1 5 However, spurred by the oil embargo of 1973,
large amounts of non-OPEC oil from outside the Persian Gulf began to
enter the market during the late 1970s and early 1980s. 6 As a result
of the slight shift in international oil supply sources, approximately
28% of global oil production now comes from the Persian Gulf, down
from 37-c in 1973.17
A. The Iran-Iraq War
The global market's becoming slightly less dependent on the
Persian Gulf for oil supplies in the 1980s paralleled Iraq's placing less
emphasis on developing its oil industry. Rising to power in 1979,18
Hussein chose to forego opportunities to nurture and expand his coun-
try's oil industry in favor of "external military adventure."1 9 In Sep-
tember 1980, Hussein launched an attack on Iran in an effort to gain
control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, beginning a grueling, drawn-
out war.20 Although the Iraqi military made some advances into Ira-
nian territory, they were eventually pushed back.2 ' In 1988, however,
a quick series of Iraqi offenses broke the Iranian will to fight.2 2 A
ceasefire treaty was signed in July 1988, which temporarily ended
Iraq's military engagement.2 3
14 Id.
1" Gawdat Bahgat, Oil and Diplomacy: American Policy in the Persian Gulf, 24
FLETcHEiR F. WORLD AFF. 143, 144 (2000).
16 Ivan Eland, Middle East: What Should the United States Do About Saddam
Hussein?, 50 EMORY L.J. 833, 848 (2001).
17 Id. at 848.
'8 See Tracey A- Basler, Note, Iraq: A Case Study of the Expulsion Provision of the
United Nations Charter, 9 NEw ENG. L\T'L & Comp. L. 259, 268-70 (2003) (discuss-
ing the problem between a Hussein-controlled Iraq and neighboring Iran).
19 Country Profile: Iraq 2000/2001, EcoN\-ozsT LN=-ELLIGENCE U-,= (2002), availa-
ble at http'//store.eiu.comfindex.asp?layout=show-sample&product-id=30000203
&countryjd=IQ [hereinafter Iraq Profile]; see also Pamela Constable, Beyond Oil,
Iraqi Industry Struggles Despite Freedom; Factories Working Far Below Capacity,
WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2003, at A14 ("Iraq's economy, once the epitome of oil-boom
consumerism and development with a 5 percent annual growth rate in the 1970s,
nearly collapsed in the 1990s under the weight of then-President Saddarn Hus-
sein's military adventures and the resulting 12 years of international sanctions.").
21 Iraq Profile, supra note 19.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
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Unfortunately for Iraq, the eight-year war left the country fi-
nancially drained and still essentially land-locked.2 4 Iraq had relied
significantly on external sources for funding and military equipment
during the war. Ironically, in light of future events, the United States
was one of Iraq's leading sources of aid throughout the 1980s.2 5 Re-
garding Iraq as a mode of thwarting Iran, which the United States
perceived as dangerous for its ambitions of exporting Islamic revolu-
tionary ideology, the United States provided foodstuffs, equipment, in-
telligence, and other assistance to Iraq.2 6 In addition to accruing a
substantial debt to the United States, Iraq became heavily indebted to
Russia, owing over $10 billion for arms purchases during the war with
Iran." Iraq also sustained nearly $30 billion in war damages. 28
Funding for these repairs was obtained largely by borrowing from va-
rious Persian Gulf states and from Western financial institutions.2 9
Iraq began the Iran-Iraq War with $35 billion in reserves and ended
with $80-100 billion in debt.3" Rather than generating revenue to pay
off debts through an expansion of oil programs, Hussein ordered the
1990 invasion of Kuwait in an effort to gain wealth and bring Iraq
closer to becoming a regional superpower.3
B. Desert Storm: Aggression Against Kuwait
Using 100,000 troops, Iraq entered Kuwait on August 2, 1990
and claimed it "annexed."3 2 Responding immediately, the United Na-
tions Security Council passed Resolution 660, which noted the exis-
tence of "a breach of international peace and security as regards the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait" and demanded that "Iraq withdraw immedi-
ately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they
were located on August 1, 1990.""3 In stubborn defiance, Hussein reit-
erated his belief that Kuwait had been annexed and claimed the inva-
sion was "irreversible."3 4 After a series of further United Nations
resolutions, the United States, in accordance with the United Nations
24 Id.
25 See George E. Bisharat, Sanctions as Genocide, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PRoBs. 379, 392 (2001).
26 Id.
27 Serge Schmemann, The World: After Hussein; Controlling Iraq's Oil Wouldn't
Be Simple, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2002, at D1.
28 Iraq Profile, supra note 19.
29 Id.
30 Bisharat, supra note 25, at 394.
31 Iraq Profile, supra note 19.
32 Basler, supra note 18, at 270-71, 273.
33 Id. at 271-72 (quoting S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
660 (1990)).
34 Id. at 273.
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Security Council's authorization, commenced "Operation Desert
Storm" with a massive air campaign on January 16, 1991. 3 The cam-
paign destroyed Iraqi command centers, communications buildings,
and air bases, which crippled Iraqi infrastructure.3 6 The United
States began the ground war on February 24, 1991, quickly forcing
Iraqi soldiers to retreat. The war was declared over on February 27,
1991. 3 7
Although Desert Storm officially ended in February 1991, its
after-effects in and around Iraq persisted for well over a decade. One
of the immediate effects was the intentional destruction of Kuwaiti oil
wells by retreating Iraqi soldiers. In the days before and during their
retreat, Iraqis managed to set fire to 650 oil wells. This act was sym-
bolic of the perceived importance of the Middle East's oil supplies to
the outside world.3" In addition to the adverse environmental conse-
quences and other wartime damages and demolition in Kuwait and
Iraq, sanctions imposed by the United Nations proved to be particu-
larly adverse for Iraq and its reconstruction efforts.
1. Economic Sanctions
Taking shape before the end of the war in the form of an em-
bargo, economic sanctions against Iraq were supported by the United
Nations Security Council. The sanctions were seen as a way to strong-
arm Iraq into complying with the various resolutions passed against
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.39 United Nations Security Council Reso-
lution 661 first imposed comprehensive multilateral sanctions on Iraq
four days after the invasion of Kuwait, prohibiting all states from en-
gaging in any economic exchanges with Iraq except for supplies used
for "strictly medical purposes" and foodstuffs meant for "humanita-
rian" purposes.4 ° Resolution 661 proved ineffective as a sanctioning
instrument, causing the Security Council to adopt Resolution 687 after
the war to reaffirm and reinforce Resolution 661's call for sanctions.4 1
In addition to severely restricting Iraq's ability to trade, Resolution
35 Id. at 274-75.
36 Id. at 275.
37 Id.
38 See Barlett & Steele, supra note 4, at 49. See generally Meredith D. Huston,
Comment, Wartime Environmental Damages: Financing the Cleanup, 23 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 899, 909-11 (2002) (providing specific details regarding the extent of
adverse environmental consequences resulting from the intentional oil spill in the
Persian Gulf and the deliberate destruction of Kuwaiti oil wells).
39 See Basler, supra note 18, at 277-78.
40 Bisharat, supra note 25, at 397 (quoting S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 2933d mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990)).
41 Luis M. Delmonte, Economic Sanctions, Iraq, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 11
TRANSNAT'L L. & Com'MP. PROBs. 345, 351 (2001).
20041
152 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 4:1
687 also established an inspection system to deactivate Iraq's most ad-
vanced conventional war capabilities, as well as its chemical, bacterio-
logical, and nuclear capabilities.4 2
The sanctions, while arguably effective in their ability to hin-
der any Iraqi attempts to sidestep United Nations restrictions on cre-
ating new weapons programs, were weighed down by problems.4 3 For
example, there was what some critics called the "moving goalpost" ten-
dency.4 4 Whenever Iraq achieved some measure of compliance, sanc-
tion requirements would be shifted and new reasons for their
maintenance would be cited. 45 Additionally, the sanctions drew sharp
criticism when vast malnutrition and other humanitarian problems in-
creased throughout Iraq and were perceived to be the result of the eco-
nomic restrictions on the country.46
2. The Oil-for-Food Program
One of the main obstacles the sanctions presented to Iraqi re-
covery was the freeze on Iraqi oil sales and outside assets. Without
such financial resources, Iraq had little to "no means to purchase sup-
plies necessary to sustain civilian life. '47 In July 1991, a United Na-
tions Report estimated that Iraqi infrastructural reconstruction would
cost $22 billion. This report helped create momentum for easing the
restrictions on Iraqi oil sales. 41 Proponents of easing the load of sanc-
tions argued that Iraq, given its substantial oil resources, should fund
the reconstruction itself. In an attempt to lessen Iraq's economic dete-
rioration, the United Nations passed additional resolutions that per-
mitted the sale of restricted amounts of oil in order to fund purchases
of food, medical supplies, and other goods imperative to the well-being
of the Iraqi citizenry.49 The initial resolutions authorized the sale of
up to $1.6 billion of oil, but the proceeds from those transactions were
to be placed into a United Nations-controlled escrow account and then
divided up for humanitarian purposes, United Nations operating ex-
penses, and compensation for Kuwait.50 Iraq initially resisted such
proposals, arguing that they disregarded Iraqi sovereignty."' This ar-
gument would be presented often to United Nations weapons inspec-
42 Id.
43 Bisharat, supra note 25, at 399-401.
44 Id. at 400.
45 id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 401.
48 Id. at 401-02.
49 Id. at 401.
50 Id. at 402.
51 Id.
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tors in years to come.52 Eventually, the United Nations passed
Resolution 986 in April 1995, commonly referred to as the "Oil-for-
Food" agreement, which Iraq ultimately accepted.53
Oil sales under the Oil-for-Food program began in late 1996,
but shortly after its implementation, the program was criticized for
being ineffective.5 4 Initially, there was a restriction limiting Iraq to $1
billion in oil sales every three months. 55 Coupled with the United Na-
tions' condition allotting only a fraction of Iraqi Oil-for-Food revenues
for humanitarian relief, the sales restrictions proved to be overly bur-
densome. In 1998, allowable sales were expanded to $5.25 billion
every six months, and restrictions on Iraqi oil sales were removed alto-
gether in December 1999.56 Despite the lifting of sales caps, the Oil-
for-Food program never became a truly beneficial system for the Iraqi
economy and society. Its main deficiency, perhaps, was the United
Nations' very slow and complicated sales approval system.57 Iraq's
trade contracts were either being rejected by the United Nations Sanc-
tions Committee or approved with delayed implementation. 8 Al-
though most agree that the Oil-for-Food program helped prevent a
disaster, critics claim it "institutionalized a state of crisis" by being
designed only to prevent further deterioration, rather than to actually
improve economic and social conditions.5 9
C. Limited Improvement of Iraqi Oil Production and Another
Armed Conflict
The Gulf War and the subsequent economic sanctions took a
"heavy toll"6 ° on the Iraqi oil industry. Two decades of nearly constant
political crises left Iraq with very limited financial resources to renew
and update the country's energy infrastructure.6" In addition to being
outdated, Iraqi oil wells were also physically harmed by the 1991 war
with as many as one-fifth of them having been irreparably damaged.6 2
Even when the volume of oil Iraq could export became unrestricted in
1999, sanctions still limited the amount of money Iraq could spend on
52 Id.
53 Delmonte, supra note 41, at 352-53 (citing S.C. Res. 986, U.N. SCOR, 3519th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (1995)).
5 Bisharat, supra note 25, at 402.
55 Delmonte, supra note 41, at 353.
56 Id.
-5 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 354 (emphasis added).
60 Bahgat, supra note 15, at 156.61 Id. at 157 (quoting Iraq: Sanctions Policy Reaches Fork in the Road, PETRoLEuI
ECOO. IST, Vol. 66, No. 2, Feb. 1999, at 39).
62 Id.
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spare parts to repair and modernize its oil industry.6" By 1999, al-
though Iraq had increased its oil production to 2.6 million barrels a
day, compared to 305,000 in 1991, other factors began to impede Iraqi
attempts at enhancing oil production capabilities.6 4
Hussein viewed United Nations weapons inspectors as an af-
front to Iraqi sovereignty. As a result, Iraq's relationship and coopera-
tion with the UNSCOM inspection team became more tenuous as the
1990s progressed until the process finally collapsed in 1999.65 The
breakdown of the inspection process signaled a fundamental rift be-
tween Iraqi leaders and the vigorous American-backed coalition aimed
at containing and ensuring Iraqi compliance with disarmament mea-
sures. Iraqi leaders predicted-and it might very well have been cor-
rect-that the United States would not lift the sanctions as long as
Hussein's regime was still in power.6 6 Despite foreign interest from
Russia, France, and China in exploring and developing Iraq's oil fields,
without the endorsement of the United States, Iraq's struggling oil in-
dustry would not have the stability and international support neces-
sary to reach its potential.6 7 In short, while Iraq had the potential and
seemed to have the willingness to expand its oil industry, the combina-
tion of political instability and limitations on Iraqi trade and spending
power was never conducive to such expansion. A change was neces-
sary in order for Iraq's oil industry to grow.
That change came in early 2003 with an armed coalition, led by
the United States and Great Britain, aimed at toppling Hussein's re-
gime. Mounting pressure from the United Nations eventually forced
Iraq to readmit weapons inspectors after considerable stalling by Hus-
sein. In late 2002, President Bush and Secretary of State Powell
openly accused Iraq of deceit and non-compliance with inspectors to
the point where war and regime change became practically inevita-
ble.6" While it was evident that Iraq violated several United Nations
resolutions and was not forthcoming with information on its weapons
programs, much of the international community, nevertheless, did not
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See David Malone, Iraq: No Easy Response to "The Greatest Threat:," 95 Am. J.
INT'L L. 235, 238 (2001) (reviewing RICHARD BUTLER, THE GREATEST THREAT: IRAQ,
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTIONS, AND THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL SECURITY (2000)).
See generally id. at 236-45 (providing a detailed background to the United Nations
weapons inspection process and its ultimate failure in Iraq).
66 Bahgat, supra note 15, at 158.
67 See generally id.
68 See, e.g., Bill Nichols, Soft Approval Greets U.S. Leader's Hard Words; Many
Insist Attack Needs U.N. Sanction, USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 2002, at A13 (describing
a speech President Bush delivered to the United Nations in which he made a force-
ful call to action in response to Iraq's "decade of defiance").
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support the aggressive military action calculated to end Hussein's re-
gime. In particular, countries that had already begun to negotiate oil
exploration contracts with Iraq were quick to argue that the United
States' proffered motive for invading Iraq-to guarantee disarmament
and to liberate the Iraqi people-was only a front, and that oil inter-
ests constituted the underlying impetus.6 9
Front or not, coalition forces undeniably placed a great empha-
sis on protecting Iraqi oil fields from the moment they entered Iraq.
Just hours after the invasion began, the coalition had seized two off-
shore oil terminals capable of transferring oil to awaiting tankers. 70
United States forces also secured the southern Rumaila oil field so
swiftly that retreating Iraqis could only set fire to nine wells, com-
pared to the hundreds destroyed in Kuwait during Desert Storm.7
Once they arrived in Baghdad, United States soldiers immediately se-
cured the Oil Ministry building while hospitals and museums were
looted.7 2 When asked about the United States military's aggressive
protection of Iraqi oil interests, General Richard Myers, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained: "I think it's, as much as anything
else, a matter of priorities."3 By the time the combat phase of the war
had ended, the inescapable conclusion that Iraq's oil industry had be-
come a primary global priority had set in firmly.
Ill. PRESENT-DAY IRAQ: PROMISE OVERSHADOWED BY
CHAOS
With coalition forces embedded in Baghdad and in other key
Iraqi cities, the country faces a deep irony: It sits on one of the largest
petroleum reserves in the world, yet it is nearly paralyzed by an en-
ergy crisis with gasoline, electricity, and fuel supplies dwindling and
unstable.7 4 Exacerbating the situation is the utter disarray of Iraq's
political, social, and industrial structures. Political instability and so-
69 See Schmemann, supra note 27. at DI (pointing out that Russia, France, China,
and Saudi Arabia-countries not supportive of the war-have "serious interests'
in the future of Iraq's oil); James Politi, Debate Over EN Sanctions to Dominate
Council Agenda, Fi-N. TmMEs London), Apr. 21, 2003, at 6 (discussing France's and
Russia's opposition to the war and to excessive United States influence in post-war
Iraq); see also Jonathan Steele, Read the Small Print: The US Wants to Privatise
Iraq's Oil, GuARDLS'," (London), Mar. 31, 2003, at IS ("Suggest that George Bush
and Tony Blair launched their war because of Saddain Hussein's suspected weap-
ons of mass destruction. Hoots of derision all round.... [Elveryone [in Syria] be-
lieves this is a war for oil.").
7o Barlett & Steele, supra note 4, at 50.
71 id.
:2 id.
'3 Id. (emphasis added).
74 Id. at 49.
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cial turmoil will make revitalizing Iraq's oil industry an arduous and
lengthy task.
A. Political Tug-of-War: An Uncertain Future
Under Hussein's regime, there was only one political voice-
the Baath Party and, in particular, Hussein and his sons. With that
regime now gone, and allied forces occupying the country, former dissi-
dents from different ethnic groups are competing for political influ-
ence.7 5 Lieutenant Paul Bremer III, head of the United States
occupation authority, has been forced to "navigate the country's un-
charted and fractious political landscape" in an attempt to mold the
most satisfactory governing body for both global and Iraqi interests.7 6
For Iraq's government to be stable, ideally, both the representatives
and constituents should be satisfied with the modes of governance.
Unfortunately, there are many grievances among the leaders of seven
key political groups who are currently collaborating with Lieutenant
Bremer and other occupation authorities. 77 Shortly after the war en-
ded, United States officials told Iraqi political leaders that there would
soon be a national assembly where hundreds of representatives from
Iraq's religious, ethnic, and tribal groups would debate the form and
membership of a transitional administration.78 In June 2003, those
leaders were told there would, instead, be an "advisory council" whose
influence would be limited to advising United States officials on policy
issues and nominating Iraqis to serve in senior positions in govern-
ment ministries.7 9 Iraqi leaders became frustrated about possibly not
having the opportunity to independently run certain ministries before
a formal transfer of power from the United States authority to a demo-
cratically elected Iraqi government, which might be more than a year
away.8 °
75 See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Iraqis Assail U.S. Plans for Council, WASH. POST,
June 2, 2003, at Al.
76 Id. Discussing the formation of a new Iraqi government, Lieutenant Bremer
admitted: "There's some work for us to be done to identify a truly representative
group." E.A. Torriero & Christine Spolar, Would-be Iraqi Rulers Doling Out Cash,
Jobs, CHI. TRIB., May 27, 2003, at Cl.77 See Chandrasekaran, supra note 75, at Al. The groups meeting with Lieuten-
ant Bremer included two main Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, the Iraqi Na-
tional Congress of Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraqi National Accord of Iyad Alawi, the
Shiite Muslim movement of Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al Hakim, the Shiite
Dawa Party, and the democratic movement of Nasir al-Chadirchy. Patrick E.
Tyler, After the War: Baghdad; Troops Attacked in Baghdad in Fresh Signs of Re-
sistance, N.Y. TiMEs, June 2, 2003, at Al.
78 Chandrasekaran, supra note 75, at Al.
79 Id.
80 Id.
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The political reconstruction process in Iraq seemingly ad-
vanced one step closer toward achieving Iraqi self-governance in mid-
July 2003, when coalition officials announced that a "governing coun-
cil" would promptly replace the advisory council in forming the "cor-
nerstone of a future Iraqi interim administration."" l Lieutenant
Bremer indicated that the council would be given the authority to ap-
prove the 2004 budget, select and dismiss ministers, appoint diplo-
mats, and assemble a commission to determine how the country's new
constitution should be written.12 However, the governing council is
not yet a fully functioning, influential political entity. Both Western
and Iraqi officials alike have criticized the council and its members for
being cantankerous, slow, and, for the most part, ineffective.8 3 The
council was expected to quickly, albeit carefully, appoint ministers,
but, instead, the group was locked in "tortured negotiations" for
weeks.8 4 During the council's first two months in existence, the extent
of its decision making has been to establish sub-committees to closely
examine individual issues.8 5
The strained dynamics of the twenty-five-member group reflect
the "delicacy of the [Iraqi] political enterprise."86 In assembling and
selecting governing council members, coalition officials faced the tedi-
ous task of trying to appease Iraq's Shiite Muslim majority, while also
making sure to include the country's ethnic minorities.8 7 Adding to the
governing council's ideological diversity, coalition officials also selected
Iraqis who had lived outside Iraq during Hussein's rule and who have
tended to be more in line with Western policies and interests.8 More-
over, Lieutenant Bremer insisted that he would consult with the coun-
cil weekly and accept their recommendations as often as possible, but
he reserved the right to overrule council decisions in "exceptional cir-
_ Stephen Farrell, Governing Council of Iraqis Will be in Place in a Week,' TIDs
(London), July 11, 2003, at 23.
82 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Plan Gives Iraqi Council Larger Governing Role; Occu-
pation Authority to Shape Membership, WASH. POST, July 11, 2003, at Al.
' See Rory McCarthy, Cabinet is Finally Named in Iraq: New Ministers Face
Huge Test of Credibility as Rifts Emerge Between Governing Council and US-Led
Administration, GUARDIAN' (London), Sept. 2, 2003, at 12.
84 Id.
5 Id.
8 Dexter Filkins & Neil MacFarquhar, After the War: The Occupation; U.S. Offi-
cial Tells Iraqis to Assert More Authority, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 21, 2003, at A12.
57 See Chandrasekaran, supra note 82, at Al.
88 See id. The inclusion of several former Iraqi exiles has been a source of contro-
versy among Iraqi citizens. ("U.S. and British officials want exiles to play a signifi-
cant role [on the council] because many of them espouse Western ideas of
democracy and religious tolerance, but they are viewed with concern by Iraqis who
never left the country."). Id. (emphasis added).
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cumstances."8 9 Several council members have critically characterized
their role as having the power to make but not enforce their own deci-
sions, because coalition forces remain in charge of security, and those
forces retain the ultimate authority to accept or decline council
recommendations. 90
Many Iraqi citizens are disgruntled over the governing coun-
cil's lack of power, the continued presence of coalition forces in Bagh-
dad, and the United Nations resolution giving the United States and
British governments the authority to run Iraq until a constitution is
drafted, national elections are held, and a new government is in
place.9 1 Some Iraqis perceive that the Americans are intentionally ex-
cluding Iraqis in an effort to customize a new government favorable to
Western interests.9 2 Evidence of this perception is continued violence
directed at American soldiers even after the Iraqi army has been offi-
cially disbanded.9 3 Supporters of Hussein's Baath Party are still pre-
sent in Baghdad and have regularly launched rocket-propelled
grenade, rifle, mortar, and suicide-bombing attacks on coalition
soldiers despite the official end of the war.9 4 Although many Iraqis are
vehemently opposed to the Baath Party, the presence of militant Sad-
dam loyalists will arguably undermine the stability of Iraq's future
government. In any case, a stable Iraqi government-necessary for
proper management of the oil industry-does not appear to be taking
form as quickly as had been anticipated. Once a permanent govern-
ment is established, Iraq's adjustment and ability to administer its oil
industry will depend on the policies put in place by the new govern-
ment to ensure the creation of the "legal bedrock of a modern
economy." 95
B. Social Instability and Adversity
Desert Storm, United Nations economic sanctions, and the
most recent war in Iraq have put a stranglehold on Iraqi citizens, mak-
89 Farrell, supra note 81, at 23.
90 See McCarthy, supra note 83, at 12.
91 Chandrasekaran, supra note 75, at Al.
92 See Patrick E. Tyler, The Mideast Turmoil: Alliances; Leading Iraqi Shiite
Cleric Emerges to Meet U.S. Ally, N.Y. TimEs, June 6, 2003, at A14. Grand Ayatol-
lah Ali al-Sestani, one of the most senior Shiite clerics in Iraq, noted that the allied
campaign to end Hussein's tyranny "is like an occupation, not a liberation, as the
people have been told." Id.
93 See Tyler, supra note 77, at Al.
9' See, e.g., id.; Roland Watson & James Hider, Iraq 'Not in Chaos, but it Needs
Billions,' TIMES (London), Aug. 28, 2003, at 16 (noting that over 140 coalition
troops have been killed since May 1, 2003, the official end of the war).
95 Schneider, supra note 8.
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ing day-to-day survival quite difficult. ' Iraq entered the 1990s as a
relatively prosperous country with a fairly high standard of living, one
of the region's best healthcare systems, and a large, educated middle
class.9 7 During the first year of sanctions, Iraq's gross domestic prod-
uct dropped 75%, sending millions of citizens into poverty.9 8 Now, in
the aftermath of the most recent war, Iraqis continue to suffer hard-
ship. Although future Iraqi oil revenues will help improve many social
problems, immediate international humanitarian aid is necessary to
address a number of issues confronting Iraqis.
1. Hunger and Malnutrition
In the early 1990s, sanctions quickly depleted the availability
of food in Iraq, and import quantities were also diminished. Supplies
of agricultural necessities, such as seed, fertilizers, and pesticides,
have been minimal over the past decade.' Additionally, fuel and
spare parts shortages have prevented refrigerated food storage facili-
ties-imperative in parts of Iraq that can reach extreme temperatures
in the summer months-from functioning properly.1°° The net result
has been widespread malnutrition among Iraqi citizens, with children
and pregnant women being the most seriously affected.'0 1 Malnutri-
tion makes the human body more susceptible to illness and death,
helping to explain why child mortality rates in Iraq have elevated sig-
nificantly over the past decade.10 2
2. Disease and Inadequate Medical Care
Related partially to malnutrition, the outbreak of certain dis-
eases has devastated Iraq. Infrastructural damage to water supply
and sewage treatment facilities has been responsible for epidemics of
cholera, typhoid, gastroenteritis, malaria, measles, polio, hepatitis,
and other diseases. 3 ' Unfortunately, the Iraqi medical system has
become grossly ill-equipped to treat such illnesses."m Hospitals, both
before and after the most recent war, have become dilapidated and
short of supplies as fundamental as syringes, surgical gloves, and sim-
ple medicines.10 5 If the Iraqi oil industry is to be revitalized, the
96 See Bisharat, supra note 25, at 406-07.
9 Id. at 406.
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health and well-being of the citizenry have to be improved
immediately.
3. Unemployment
Before the most recent war commenced, the Iraqi unemploy-
ment rate was approximately 50%.1°6 Since the war, that figure has
grown significantly worse.10 7 The extremely heavy bombing of the co-
alition's "Shock and Awe" tactic damaged factories, roads, and other
aspects of Iraqi infrastructure. Furthermore, looting and other crimes
have devalued businesses, requiring owners to lay off most of their em-
ployees.' 0 The practical result of millions of unemployed Iraqis has
been a preying ground for formerly exiled political groups that are now
attempting to soar to power.' 0 9 Some of Iraq's competing political par-
ties have been recruiting citizens on the streets of Baghdad in ex-
change for monetary compensation or promises of future
employment." 0 U.S. officials fear that this form of "political muscle"
could result in corrupt elections and produce a "strongman rule" that
would exclude large segments of Iraqi society, undermining efforts to
create a diverse and stable government."'
4. Energy Shortages
One of Iraq's most serious societal problems is its electricity
crisis. During the war, shooting and bombing badly damaged power
lines that move electricity into and around Baghdad." 2 As a result,
electricity supplies to factories and other businesses have been drasti-
cally cut to accommodate residential areas, which account for 80% of
all electricity use. 113 Business owners are forced to fire employees be-
cause they are not able to afford to run their factories full-time.'1 4 Ad-
ditionally, there is very little electricity to power street lights in the
city, which encourages robbery, looting, and other forms of dangerous
street crimes at night." 5 Although the Army Corps of Engineers and
a private American power company have been working day and night
to help repair damaged electricity lines, power shortages still exist and
106 Id. at 408.
107 Torriero & Spolar, supra note 76, at C1.
108 See infra Part III.B.4.
109 Torriero & Spolar, supra note 76, at C1.
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pose a serious threat to the Iraqi economy.116 Some worry that the
slow pace of power restoration to Iraqi industry "could devastate
what's left of an economy already weakened by twelve years of
sanctions."' 7
C. A Battered Oil Industry
For a country dependent on oil for over 90% of its export earn-
ings, that ever-so-important industry is in deplorable shape."' The
Iraqi oil industry is plagued by fractured pipelines, rusting equipment,
and 1970s technology that has become antiquated by contemporary in-
dustry standards.'1 9 The exploitation of Iraq's oil reserves is still at a
very premature stage, with only fifteen of its seventy-three known
fields currently developed. 20 There is also a good deal of unknown
information when one considers the fact that no major oil exploration
has been conducted in Iraq since 1980.21 In addition to having dilapi-
dated equipment, some of the oil fields themselves have been damaged
by the practice of injecting water into reservoirs to build up
pressure. 122
The Iraqi industrial infrastructure in general is ill-equipped to
handle an immediate resurgence in the oil exportation industry. As it
currently stands, Iraq is pumping considerably less oil than it did
before Desert Storm."2 Some fault, to be sure, can be attributed to
wartime damages. During the 1991 Gulf War, for example, key ship-
ping terminals were damaged. During the most recent conflict, a ma-
jor export pipeline to Syria was severed.' 24 However, additional fault
points to Hussein's regime and, arguably, the imposition of United Na-
tions economic sanctions. Hussein's regime lacked the foresight and/or
116 Id; see also Susan Milligan & Stephen J. Glain, Violence Derails Iraq Rebuild-
ing: Security Needs Take Precedence, B. GLOBE, Aug. 24, 2003, at Al ("Pentagon
officials did not prevent the looting and destruction of Iraq's infrastructure, from
its electrical grids to telephone lines and oil pipelines. No electricity means no
pumps to distribute fresh water, no air conditioning, and no streetlights to deter
thieves after dark").
117 Banejee, supra note 112, § 3, at 1.
118 Libera, supra note 10, at 303.
119 Barlett & Steele, supra note 4, at 49; see also Countr' Analysis Briefs: Iraq,
U.S. DEPT. EN-ERGY, Feb. 2003, available at http'//eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iraq.html
(describing Iraq's poor oil reservoir management, corrosion problems at various oil
facilities; deterioration of water injection facilities; lack of spare parts. materials.
equipment, etc.; damage to oil storage and pumping facilities: and more).
120 Goodman, supra note 5, at A16.
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revenues to purchase a sufficient number of storage tanks, a basic re-
quirement for oil exportation.125 As a result, if bad weather prevents
oil tankers from docking and filling up, oil production must stop. 126 In
total, experts estimate a cost of more than $30 billion over the next few
years if Iraq wants to bring its oil output up to a potential six-million
barrels a day.1 27
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE IRAQI OIL INDUSTRY: CAUTIOUS
OPTIMISM
As the twenty-first century progresses, and with Hussein's re-
gime now dead, the focus of global oil companies and oil-consuming
nations is, once again, on the Middle East and, in particular, Iraq. 1 28
Not only does Iraq have the second-largest volume of proven oil
reserves, but also Iraq's location in the Fertile Crescent gives it the
world's most prolific, accessible, and efficient wells. 1 29 Easily accessi-
ble wells translate into incredibly inexpensive oil production costs.
Even Saudi Arabia, another Middle Eastern country with a large vol-
ume of oil reserves, has to spend over twice as much money extracting
a barrel of oil out of the ground than Iraq.'3 ° Iraq's re-entry into the
global energy business as a major player comes at a time when coun-
tries worldwide are more dependent on petroleum supplies than ever,
especially the United States. As the world's largest importer of crude
oil, the United States' oil imports have been rising since 1982 and are
expected to continue rising in the future. 1 3 1 When these two factors-
Iraq's oil potential and the world's growing need-are considered, it is
easy to understand why Iraq's post-war reconstruction is drawing in-
tense interest from the international community. With this interest
come several important issues, however, some of which are likely to
cause controversy and tension over the next few years.
A. The Need for a Stable Investment Climate in Iraq
The transition to a democratic Iraqi government forces the
Iraqi citizenry to endure an 1800 ideological turn. Some will embrace
the new form of government, while others might rebel through vio-
lence or threatening propaganda. The current situation in Iraq is "not
just a change of government but the forging of a new social contract for
a country that has endured much pain and suffering for around a
125 Id.
126 Id.
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129 Barlett & Steele, supra note 4, at 49-50.
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quarter of a century."1 3 2 Political and economic instability are inevita-
ble byproducts of such a drastic change of culture and leadership.
Iraqis realize that one of the keys to restoring stability to their country
will be increasing their oil exports. However, when one considers the
$30 billion projected cost of repairing Iraq's oil infrastructure and
bringing oil-pumping volumes to desired levels, foreign investment is
an absolute necessity.1 3
Large oil companies, fortunately, are interested in going back
into Iraq because of its vast potential, untapped fields, and very inex-
pensive extraction costs." M Unfortunately for Iraq, the much-needed
foreign capital might not become available for a few years.1 35 Foreign
companies might find it difficult to justify investing in a country where
no government exists to sanction contracts, develop new fields, or de-
termine the validity of old contracts.136 To attract the needed capital,
Iraq will "need a stable regime in Baghdad-an entity nowhere yet in
sight."'3 7 However, when stability does exist in Iraq, "there [will be]
room for everybody"' who wants to invest in its young and promising
oil market. 13 9
B. Security Services and Protection
Along the same lines as the need for political stability in Iraq,
investors and potential businesses will also need Iraqi reassurance of
security services and general protection for their employees and
projects in Iraq.'4 ° The end of the war has not necessarily meant the
end of the fighting, as evidenced through the numerous suicide bomb-
ings and shooting attacks aimed at coalition military personnel in the
132 Issam al-Chalabi, Iraqi Oil Policy: Present and Future Perspectives, OIL & GAS
J., Mar. 24, 2003, at 42.
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GAS J., May 5, 2003, at 112.
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weeks after the end of combat operations. 1 4 1 Similarly, Western com-
panies "setting up shop in a post-Saddam Iraq will face the threat of
violence on a daily basis, drawing unwanted attention from recalci-
trant Saddam loyalists and possibly the al Qaeda terrorist
network."1 42
Sabotage of Iraqi oil pipelines became an increasingly alarming
menace to reconstruction efforts in the months following the end of the
war. 143 In mid-summer 2003 alone, more than two dozen pipelines
were reported to have ruptured, due primarily to acts of sabotage. 144
Iraq's largest and most important pipeline with Turkey came under
attack in early August 2003, costing the rebuilding effort an estimated
seven-million dollars a day.145 Absent sufficient security measures,
would-be foreign investors will likely delay their participation in Iraqi
oil ventures, which will, in turn, "significantly delay" the anticipated
oil revenues needed for reconstruction. 146
If the efficacy of attacks on the main oil pipeline in Colombia by
FARC'14 rebels as a means of opposing the Colombian government is
any indication of tactics Iraqi terrorists might employ in opposition to
the coalition's occupation, the safety of new Iraqi oil projects will be
severely compromised.' 4 s Furthermore, sabotage to pipelines is not
the only legitimate concern for foreign investors-ethnic squabbles be-
tween Iraq's Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites are also real possibilities that
could put the oil endeavors of foreign companies at risk.149
C. Bitterness and Skepticism of the United States and Its Motives
Another concern expressed by several countries is the extent to
which the United States will control and oversee Iraq during its recon-
141 See Schneider, supra note 8.
142 Id.
143 See Robert Manor, Gasoline Driven Upward; Global Events, Stronger Economy
Boost Petroleum Costs, CHI. TRB., Aug. 20, 2003, at Cl (explaining that the"gusher of oil" expected from Iraq has largely failed to materialize due to explo-
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struction. 150 Countries like Russia, France, China, and Saudi Arabia
are particularly concerned since the fate of Iraqi oil is of "critical na-
tional interest" to them.'1' Both Russia and France have been openly
reluctant to -hand over the management of Iraq's oil sales to the
United States" before a transitional government takes power.' 5 2
French President Jacques Chirac has called for the United Nations to
have a "central role" in both the political and commercial reconstruc-
tion of Iraq.'" If countries begin to believe that the United States'
method of supervising the reconstruction has become too catered to its
own interests, there could be serious damage done to the United
States' credibility within the United Nations and around the world.15 4
Excessive tension could also complicate the negotiation of oil contracts
in Iraq. Though recent developments indicate the United Nations will
likely broaden its role in supervising Iraq's reconstruction, the scope of
its future influence remains to be seen.' 5 5
D. Uncertainty over Honoring Existing Contracts and the Creation
of New Contracts
One of the most significant, but unknown, factors in the recon-
struction of Iraq involves whether or not Iraqi oil contracts given to
Russia, France, and China while Hussein's regime was still in power
should be honored.' 56 For example, a Russian company, Lukoil,
formed a S3.7 billion contract to expand Iraq's West Qurna field sev-
eral years ago. 1 57 Although Hussein's regime invalidated the contract
in early 2003, Lukoil feels it still has a "legally binding contract" that
was "signed according to international law and agreed to by the Iraqi
parliament."1 5 ' Determining whether to honor the previous contracts
Iraq made with Russia, France, and China will largely establish the
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degree of cooperation present as the international community com-
petes to participate in the future of Iraq's oil industry. Many individu-
als involved in Iraq's oil industry believe that the war replaced one set
of preferred beneficiaries (France, Russia, and China) with another:
"Hussein's former allies are out, while those who won the war will get
most of the deals."" 9 While there most likely will not be an extreme
shift in loyalties, subtle favoritism towards the United States and
Great Britain could result, fueling an already present controversy.
E. Nature of Iraq's Future Membership in OPEC
One final issue of importance concerns Iraq's future as a mem-
ber of OPEC. Although Iraq was a founding member of the oil cartel,
it has not had a quota due to United Nations supervision over the past
decade.160 However, now that sanctions have been lifted, Iraq would
be legally free to re-enter OPEC as a quota-sharing member, export oil
under a new United Nations program, or export under no program. 16 1
Iraq's decision will have significant consequences for other OPEC
members. For example, if Iraq re-enters OPEC and establishes a
higher-than-normal quota, another OPEC country would have to lower
its production accordingly, potentially losing billions of dollars.' 6 2 It is
too early to predict Iraq's likely export strategy, but its ultimate choice
will directly affect oil-producing and oil-purchasing countries.
V. CONCLUSION
A few years ago, Iraq was a country on a downward spiral in
economic, political, and social terms. Now, regardless of whether the
United States and Great Britain were completely justified in invading
Iraq and ousting Hussein, Iraq's future seems brighter, albeit uncer-
tain. In a time of great international dependence on petroleum, Iraq's
massive reserves are now "on the market" for exploration and exporta-
tion. Although Iraq's present political circumstances are too unstable
to attract substantial foreign investments immediately, a restructur-
ing of Iraq's political and industrial infrastructures will bode well for
future investments. Iraq's re-entry into the global energy market as a
major player is imminent, and once it happens, oil suppliers and con-
sumers will undoubtedly feel the shockwaves. 163
159 Id.
160 Stephen Wyatt, OPEC Dynamic the Key Issue for Price, AusTL. FIN. REV., Apr.
22, 2003, at 25.
161 Id.
162 See Melita Marie Garza, Questions Flow on Iraq's Oil: Supply Uncertainties
Produce a Growing Disarray in OPEC, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 20, 2003, at C1.163 See Barlett & Steele, supra note 4, at 49.
